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Abstract 
 
Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” government regime will end by 2047and it will 
promote the country’s integration into the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To ensure a 
smooth transition, by eliminating the border and other forms of geographic barriers that separate 
the two countries, the PRC has been issuing measures to promote integration. However, despite 
on-going practices of integration, Hong Kong continues to strengthen its border with China 
through infrastructural and bureaucratic means, reinforcing a British-colonial era border regime. 
Thus, my research focuses on this contradiction between the elimination and reinforcement of 
the Hong Kong-China border as an attempt to understand the socio-political forces that have 
produced this dynamic. Analysing the historical conditions that have produced the Hong Kong-
China border regime through the lens of material and visual culture, I have come to the 
conclusion that Hong Kong continues to invest in the border as a political strategy to resist 
Mainlandization so that its autonomy continues to be preserved.  
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Introduction 
On January 6, 2018, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) State Council approved 
Guangdong’s request to demolish the physical border which divides the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone from Hong Kong. The decision was made to promote integration between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong. The border between Shenzhen and Hong Kong is delineated 
with an 84.6 mile iron fence along the Shenzhen (or Shun Chun) river, the natural boundary 
dividing the two geographic bodies (Leung, 2018). While this decision is symbolic of the PRC’s 
expansion of sovereignty into Hong Kong territory in response to the expiration of Hong Kong’s 
border with the PRC in 2047, events like these are calling into question Hong Kong’s status as an 
autonomous body -- one that consists of its unique set of laws, values, and culture distinct from 
those of mainland China.  
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Hong Kong’s existence as a distinct country was legitimized after the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration was signed on December 19, 1984 (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau). 
Between 1842 and 1997, Hong Kong was a British crown colony. However, Hong Kong was 
officially handed over back to China after the declaration was signed.  This negotiation 
established the “One Country, Two Systems” government regime, allowing Hong Kong to retain 
its current economic and political systems under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Basic Law, or Hong 
Kong’s unique constitution, was also established. Therefore, Hong Kong is now essentially able 
to operate autonomously under Chinese rule as a Special Administrative Region (SAR). 
However, since this “One Country, Two Systems” regime is expected to expire in 2047, Hong 
Kong’s autonomy is being threatened by the PRC’s efforts to integrate Hong Kong into mainland 
China.  
The process of Hong Kong’s integration into the PRC, colloquially called 
“Mainlandization” (Tsung-gan, 2017), is occurring through recent infrastructural developments 
that transcend natural international borders. Just two months ago, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai 
bridge - a bridge that connects the three-regions to one another - opened to the public (Griffiths, 
2018). Similarly, the West Kowloon railway station opened in September. It is the only terminus 
in Hong Kong where a high-speed bullet train can be taken to different parts of mainland China 
(Chung, 2018). By observing these new developments, one can see how the PRC is making 
strides to expand its influence into Hong Kong.  
While the natural border separating Hong Kong and the PRC is being dismantled both in 
its physicality and its geographic proximity to the mainland, the government of Hong Kong 
continues to fortify its existing border control points. Lo Wu (or Luohu) Control Point, the 
busiest border crossing point in Hong Kong, has evolved from being an outdoor crossing-bridge 
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into a complex institution governed by high surveillance and strict border regulations. According 
to the Hong Kong Immigration Department’s 2016 annual report, Hong Kong’s border-crossing 
points have made impressive strides on safety and cross-border migration efficiency. It boasts 
about its technological advancements in implementing cutting-edge border technologies, and its 
achievements in reducing crime rates. The report also provides insight into the complex 
bureaucracy of the Hong Kong Immigration Department, where its array of border branches are 
briefly described. Thus, these advancements are testament to Hong Kong’s interest in its borders 
with the mainland.  
It is the contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to erase its natural borders with Hong 
Kong and Hong Kong’s continuous investments in its border ports that poses a range of 
questions. Why does Hong Kong continue to invest in the development of the border if the 
border will expire in 2047? How does the PRC’s efforts in dismantling the natural border 
through the bypassing of geographical restrictions come into conflict with Hong Kong’s efforts 
to protect it? What does this mean for Hong Kong’s political and economic sovereignty? Thus, 
my research explores this contradiction expressed by the simultaneous creation and destruction 
of Hong Kong’s natural borders with the PRC in an attempt to provide some insights into the 
questions I have posed.  
This contradiction will be unpacked by concentrating on Hong Kong’s history during and 
after British-colonial rule, and I would use its geopolitical context to draw connections between 
the then and now. More specifically, I observe Hong Kong’s border regime with mainland China 
and its wider political implications through the lens of material culture and spatial practices. 
Drawing from scholarly work produced by experts in Hong Kong’s history and investigating 
20th-century photographs taken in Hong Kong, I have come to the conclusion that Hong Kong 
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continues to invest in its border with China, despite its expiration in 2047, as a political strategy 
to protect and preserve its autonomy as a political, economic, and social geographic body that is 
distinct from China’s.  
It is imperative to emphasize that this study geographically frames Hong Kong as an 
island - one that is delineated by natural boundaries and coastal edges. The island of Hong Kong, 
which spans a total of 427.8 square miles (Central Intelligence Agency), should not be confused 
with “Hong Kong Island”, which is a separate geographic body, albeit under the State of Hong 
Kong, that is located in the Southern-portion of Hong Kong. Thus, I focus on both the natural 
border between Hong Kong and China delineated by the Shenzhen River, as well as the man-
made borders between the two political bodies.  
 
Map of the Hong Kong-China border, illustrated by the black line. (Danielewicz-Betz & Graddol, 2014) 
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Historical Context  
To understand the evolution of Hong Kong’s border regime, it is important to underscore 
the significance that war and conquest had on its initial development. Hong Kong’s entry into the 
international stage can be traced back to the First Opium War (1839-1842) between the British 
and China, to which Hong Kong was under Chinese rule at the time. After losing the war, China 
ceded Hong Kong to the British and the Treaty of Nanking was signed on August 29, 1842, 
which officially marked Hong Kong as a British crown colony. The British, however, were not 
satisfied with the conditions laid out by the Treaty, claiming it didn’t promise the wealth and 
prosperity that controlling Hong Kong’s ports would offer. Thus, the Second Opium War broke 
out in the 1850s, and it resulted in the colony’s expansion into the Kowloon Peninsula. The 
Treaty of Tientsin, signed in June 1858, codified the colony’s expansion into China, opening 10 
more Chinese ports to trade and providing Western missionaries access to the Chinese hinterland 
(Carroll, 2007, pp. 13-23). The colony expanded again after the British acquired the New 
Territories, the 365-mile rural territory spanning between Kowloon and the Shenzhen River. 
During the Second Convention of Peking on June 9, 1898, the British negotiated a lease with 
China in which the British were given the New Territories for 99-years - a lease that would 
expire in 1997. The land was used by the British as military training grounds and real estate 
development (Carroll, 2007, p. 67). Thus, the expansion of the former British colony up to the 
Shenzhen River set the stage for border conflicts to ensue.  
The conditions that propagated Hong Kong’s border regime intensified during the 
Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. During the Sino-Japanese war in 1941, Japanese troops 
entered Hong Kong through the Shenzhen River border and wreaked havoc on the British 
military. After the British military surrendered in their battle against the Japanese, the Japanese 
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remained in Hong Kong and took control of the colony for almost four years under martial law. 
These four years marked a brutal period of history characterized by violence and rape in Hong 
Kong. As a result of these atrocities, the population in Hong Kong fell by half since many Hong 
Kongers either fled the country or died. It was not until August 30, 1945 when Japan finally 
surrendered and handed over Hong Kong back to the British (Carroll, 2007, pp.119-123). Thus, 
the Japanese occupation destabilized Hong Kong and created an environment of fear that would 
encourage a greater British military presence along the Shenzhen river border to ensure that the 
colony is protected from outside military forces.  
The years following the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong was marked by a period of 
open borders and improved economic relations between China and Hong Kong. During this time 
period, Hong Kong’s border was open to facilitate free trade with the mainland and the rest of 
the world. However, it wasn’t until 1949 when the border militarized and closed in response to 
Chinese refugees. In 1949, the Chinese Civil War broke out between the Communist Party and 
the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang), in which the Communists won. Due to the fear that the 
rise of Communist power instilled in the Chinese population, thousands of Chinese fled the 
country and migrated into Hong Kong. Given that the border remained open at the time, the 
British Colonial government allowed Chinese refugees to freely pour in under the assumption 
that the situation was temporary and that they would eventually return to the mainland once its 
political situation pacified. However, from November 1949 to December 1949, more than 
210,422 refugees migrated into the colony (Madokoro, 2012, pp. 410-412). In response to the 
massive influx of refugees, the British decided to close its border with China because they were 
afraid that the colony was oversaturated with unskilled laborers who would damage the economy 
(Smart and Smart, 2008, p. 181). Likewise, because this occurred during the Cold War era, the 
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British wanted to prevent any Communist-influence into their colony. Thus, to signify the 
closure of the border and to keep migrants from freely crossing it, a fence was constructed along 
the Shenzhen River. This is the first instance of a physical demarcation between the two entities, 
and the beginning of its increased militarization and surveillance (Madokoro, 2012, p. 412).   
While the Shenzhen river border technically remained closed during the 1950s, border 
activity still continued. Native Hong Kongers would pass in and out of the country to visit family 
and purchase goods in the mainland. Illegal cross-border activity also thrived at the time, which 
led to an increased presence of security at the border. However, the refugee situation remained 
stable up until the spring of 1962, when over half a million Chinese refugees were marching into 
Hong Kong through the Shenzhen river border. The Chinese refugee caravan entering Hong 
Kong was due to the hostile conditions that the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong’s initiative to 
industrialize the country under a collectivization regime, created in China. Thus, to deter 
refugees from entering the country, the British dispatched military soldiers and police officers to 
the Shenzhen River border, where 17, 656 Chinese migrants were arrested. In addition, seventy 
five of refugees attempting to enter Hong Kong were sent back to the Mainland through violent 
measures such as deportations, expulsions, and physical force. Because the border situation 
became too much for the British to regulate, they had no choice but to ask the PRC for 
assistance, in which the PRC sent military personnel to their side of the border. Thus, given that 
the British produced hostile conditions at the border, mainlanders did not see Hong Kong as a 
place of refuge anymore (Madokoro, 2012, pp.416-418).  
The border further militarized in 1967 following the Leftist riots that broke out across 
Hong Kong. Inspired by China’s Cultural Revolution, leftist Hong Kongers coalesced and 
organized protests resisting British colonial rule. Border ports, in particular, became active 
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spaces of confrontation for these protests to occur. Therefore, in response to the increased 
political activity at the Hong Kong-China border, the British and Hong Kong deployed more 
police officers and soldiers there. Additionally, the Hong Kong government took legal measures 
to restrict migration and access to the border by implementing tighter border controls that made 
it even more difficult for Hong Kong people and the Chinese to cross. Likewise, an additional 
fence was erected at the Lo Wu Control Point as an extra barrier of protection. It was constructed 
in response to the violent incidents that occurred there between law enforcement and protesters. 
However, since Hong Kong authorities sought it necessary to secure the entirety of the Shenzhen 
river border as opposed to solely a small portion of it, a thirty-foot wide fence was constructed 
along the river. Therefore, to ensure that these new barriers are protected, military and police 
officers have been permanently dispatched at the border (Madokoro, 2012, pp. 420-422). 
While the restrictions at the border remained stringent, Hong Kong opened up its borders 
again to trade with China after 1978. After Mao Zedong died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took 
control of the PRC. Implementing the Open Door Policy and other neoliberal economic reforms, 
China entered the international economic arena (Smart et al., 2007, p. 183). Thus, the British 
opened up Hong Kong’s border ports to facilitate commodity flow with China. Border controls 
became further complicated in 1984, when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed.  
After Hong Kong was officially handed over back to China in 1997, border controls were 
imperative in maintaining the “One Country, Two Systems” regime. In terms of immigration, 
cross-border migration has become asymmetrical. While Hong Kong citizens are now able to 
cross the border into China without any restrictions, mainland Chinese citizens must obtain a 
visa prior to entering Hong Kong. Nonetheless, after 1997, the Hong Kong-China border 
continued to fortify and securitize in response to technological and economic advancements. 
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Cutting edge border technologies such as the Automated Passenger Clearance Systems, and 
smart Hong Kong ID cards containing biometric information have been installed at the Lo Wu 
Control point to manage cross-border migration more efficiently. Additionally, Hong Kong is 
one of the China’s biggest importers, dependent on the Mainland for food provision. Thus, 
careful inspection at the border is necessary to regulate and secure the flow of commodities and 
to ensure the safety of imported food. Additionally, border surveillance has significantly 
increased in response to public health crises. The Avian flu outbreak in 1997, as well as the 
SARs (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak in 2003, led to deaths of many in Hong 
Kong and the populations of its trading partners (Smart et al., 2007, pp. 189-190). Therefore, in 
addition to the increased militarization, technological development, and securitization of the 
border, screening and surveillance also expanded to prevent lethal diseases from spreading. 
 
An Analysis of the Sha Tau Kok Border Control Point and its Relationship to the Hong 
Kong Border Regime 
To understand the Hong Kong-China border regime on a grassroots level, I would show 
the Sha Tau Kok border crossing by unpacking the photos taken there. Located inside the 
Frontier Closed Area (FCA), the Sha Tau Kok border crossing point is the least used control 
point to enter mainland China. Sha Tau Kok is historically known to be a small rural border 
village. Designated as an FCA by the Hong Kong government, people are restricted to enter the 
space unless special permission is given. However, Shau Tau Kok is still home to fishing and 
farming communities of Hakka descent, remaining a traditional town that is untouched by 
outside forces (David, 2012). However, its border tells a different story.  
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Figure 1 
 
Sha Tau Kok border before the 1950s, as delineated by the rock on the lower-left corner (Forman, 1949) 
 
Taken by Harrison Forman (Figure 1) , an American photojournalist for the New York 
Times, this photo depicts Sha Tau Kok back in the 1950s. More specifically, this photo is taken 
on Chung Ying Street, which translates to China England Street. The stone on the lower-left 
corner of the photograph is the border crossing point that separates the Chinese territory from the 
British territory. The stone is located in the center of Chung Ying Street, dividing the street 
equally into their respective territories. This stone is coined the “Anglo-Chinese boundary stone” 
because it was strategically placed here by the British in 1889, after the British acquired the New 
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Territories, to delineate its territory with China (Emily and Michelle and Olivier, 2013). This 
land boundary was placed in the middle of the street by J.H.S Lockhard and Huang Tsun-hsin 
due to a disagreement over whether the Chinese or the British should exercise ownership over 
the village (Kelly, 1987, pp.39-40).  
Observing this photograph, one can notice the two British guards are leisurely standing 
around the building behind the right side of the boundary stone. Based on their location, I would 
assume that the British territory is to the right of the stone. The British guards are dressed in 
casual Hong Kong military attire, wearing clothing that exposes their arms and legs. Based on 
what they are wearing, there does not seem to be any immediate threats to the space. Moreover, 
the British guard without the sunglasses looks like he’s carrying a baton on his black belt. The 
British guard with the sunglasses, however, seems to not be carrying any weapons. The lack of 
machinery on them, once again, reinforces the lack of danger the area posits.  
  The casual attire and the lack of machinery on the British guards calls into question the 
magnitude of the border point’s political significance. As mentioned earlier, the 1950s was a 
time when borders were being increasingly militarized and policed in response to the influx of 
mainland Chinese refugees pouring into Hong Kong. However, looking at the photograph of the 
Sha Tau Kok border crossing point, this migration pattern doesn’t seem to exist. There is no 
large crowd of people, nor is there any concentrated human activity depicted in the photograph 
that would indicate an occurring of any refugee crisis.  
Nonetheless, the lack of British guard personnel surrounding the Sha Tau Kok border 
point indicates that this crossing point is not heavily used by migrants. This makes sense given 
its geographic location astray from the Shenzhen River - the natural boundary where main 
immigration points such as Lo Wu and Lok Mau Chau are located. Additionally, because the 
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border crossing point literally exists in the middle of the road separating the colony from China, 
the subjectivity of a “Chinese refugee” is blurred, given that Chinese residents can freely cross 
the invisible border without needing to go through screening or security. The stone’s seemingly 
arbitrary location makes it difficult to determine if Chinese residents who live on Chun Ying 
Street are even recognized by the PRC as Chinese citizens.  
Essentially, the lack of military defense depicted in this photo implies that during the 
1950s, border surveillance had yet to be formalized into a significant institution. The case of Sha 
Tau Kok must be taken lightly, however, given its exceptional nature as being a border entry 
point that is not along the Shenzhen River.  
 
Figure 2 
                             
Hong Kong soldiers (left) and PRC soldiers (right) walking side-by-side (Gwulo, 1997) 
Figure 2, taken by an unknown photographer, was captured in 1997, after the British 
officially handed over their former colony Hong Kong back to China. This photograph is a more 
modern depiction of Chung Ying Street and the border crossing stone. Compared to the 
photograph of the stone taken in the mid-20th century, one can observe the differences within the 
urban landscape. What once looked like a humble, traditional village town now looks more 
modern and vibrant. To the left of the border stone are two Hong Kong military soldiers, and to 
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the right are two PRC military soldiers -- as promptly identified based on their attire. Based on 
the placement of the soldiers, it is safe to assume that the left side is Hong Kong territory while 
the right is PRC territory. Looking at the side of PRC territory, the newly erected wall lined with 
different colored flags may be a landmark of Chinese sovereignty of the space.  
While it was noted in Figure 1 that the right side of the boundary stone is British territory, 
that doesn’t necessarily mean that the right side of Figure 2 is now Hong Kong territory. It could 
be that Figure 2 was taken in front of the boundary stone rather than behind, or vice versa, which 
would change the orientation of the two territories. However, based on the outfits that the 
soldiers are wearing in Figure 2, it is safe to assume that the right side of the stone (only in the 
context of Figure 2), is the Chinese territory. 
Nonetheless, this photograph is a literal manifestation of the “One Country, Two 
Systems” on a local level, giving insight into how Mainland China is expanding its influence 
over Hong Kong territory post hand-over. After Hong Kong was handed over back to China, 
Chung Ying Street was designated by the government of Hong Kong as an FCA, in which Hong 
Kong citizens, to this day, are not allowed to enter this space unless a permit is administered to 
them by the government. A permit can only be received if Hong Kongers have family members 
who still live in the Sha Tau Kok village. This is not the case for the PRC, however, in that 
Chung Ying Street has become a tourist hub for mainlanders. While the street is still restricted to 
mainland Chinese citizens, permits to enter can be easily purchased for 10 RMB. Due to the 
influx of Chinese tourists entering Chung Ying Street, the street has become commercialized. 
Shopping malls, and a historical museum, have opened up on the street (Michelle et al., 2013). 
This phenomenon is significant in the context of the Hong Kong-China border regime in that the 
boundary stone delineating the division between Hong Kong and China has officially lost its 
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political significance as a border marker. Because Hong Kong is now under the federal 
jurisdiction of the PRC, Chun Yin Street has technically become China’s property. And given 
that there are less restrictions for Mainland Chinese to enter Chun Ying Street compared to the 
restrictions on Hong Kongers, the asymmetrical access to the space illustrates the PRC’s subtle 
coercion of power over Hong Kong territory -- thus manifesting the “Mainlandization” effect. 
  
Figure 3 
 
Sha Tau Kok border before the 1950s, depicted by the boundary stone (Forman, 1949) 
    
 Figure 4 
                                    
Sha Tau Kok border in 2015, depicted by the fortified control point (Cheung, 2015) 
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 The last two photos I will be analyzing and comparing are the Sha Tau Kok border point 
in the mid-20th century (Figure 3) and the Sha Tau Kok Control Point now (Figure 4). As one 
can see, while the two border points depicted share the same function of delineating boundaries 
between Hong Kong and China, they look nothing alike. While the border between the former 
British colony and China is ambiguously delineated by the boundary stone in the left photo, the 
border between Hong Kong and China in the right photo is depicted as a formalized control point 
- one with customs agents, toll booths, and conventional border infrastructure. Cross-analyzing 
these two photos provides a deep insight on how the natural Hong Kong-China border has been 
fortified and militarized under the State.  
As mentioned above, the border crossing stone separating China and Hong Kong has lost 
its political significance after Hong Kong was handed over back to China. Even though the stone 
does not signify a formal border -- one represented by fencing or walls -- between the two 
entities, a Sha Tau Kok border still exists. The Sha Tau Kok Control point now, illustrated in the 
right photo, is located close, but outside of Chun Ying Street. What this literally indicates is that 
the border between the two countries has been arbitrarily moved to a different location. The most 
practical reason as to why the border could have moved to its current location is that it is closest 
and most easily accessible to Guangdong, China. Looking at the photo on the right, the high-rise 
buildings that exist beyond the control point illustrate the city of Tianen - a city in Guangdong. 
Thus, it could potentially be that this control point provides the fastest access to the city center of 
Tianen. However, there is not information available on this control point to fully grasp the main 
reason.  
As previously mentioned, there were no physical barriers that separated the two sides of 
Chun Ying Street in the mid-20th century. Depicted in the left photo, the rock stands in the 
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center of the road, with the same amount of urban development on either side. Because there is 
no fencing and border patrol agents in sight, the lady in the black is able to freely migrate across 
the border. Given that Sha Tau Kok is a unique exception to the politicization of border control 
points along the Shenzhen River in the 1950s, it is clear that the border stone held no tangible 
geopolitical significance in which cross-boundary mobility was not the main concern for military 
personnel deployed there at the time.  However, this is not the case in the present, in which the 
creation of a formal control point at the Hong Kong-China border has political and legal 
connotations. Because the control point is located in the FCA, a Closed Road Permit is necessary 
if drivers want to cross the border (Hong Kong Transport Department, 2018). Cross-boundary 
car and bus services authorized by the Hong Kong government are also available if travelers 
want to cross the border using public transportation. This institutionalization of transportation 
across the Sha Tau Kok border is an example of how politicized the border is now, in that the 
State regulates and controls all activity that occurs there through an increase in bureaucratic 
practices. Likewise, the creation of a formal border port is also necessary for the Hong Kong 
government to legitimize its boundaries as an autonomous entity separate from China, 
reinforcing the “One Country, Two Systems” regime.  
 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the history of the Hong Kong-China border regime from pre-Colonial British 
rule to post-Colonial British rule, and unpacking its nuances through my analysis on the Sha Tau 
Kok border, I have come to a variety of conclusions. The first conclusion is that the Hong Kong-
China border became politicized due to the migration of Mainlanders into Hong Kong. Within 
the context of World War II and the Cold War, the social and political conditions produced in 
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mainland China has resulted in massive influxes of refugees into Hong Kong which lead to the 
beginning stages of border militarization and fortification. The second conclusion of this study is 
that while war and conquest set the foundation for the Hong Kong-China border regime to exist, 
it is the radical changes in history that has propagated the development and advancement of the 
border. Changes such as the decolonization of Hong Kong and the creation of a “One Country, 
Two Systems” government regime has given the border a new meaning. What once was a natural 
boundary between two regions, has now become a frontier that separates two distinct political 
and economic systems from one another. The final conclusion, encompassing the previous 
conclusions, is that the PRC will continue to exercise their power in different ways -- subtle and 
blatant - to ensure that by 2047, Hong Kong will be completely integrated into China. Whether 
it’s through the creation of new cross-national bridges and public transportation or the arbitrary 
relocation of the border at Sha Tau Kok, the PRC is taking direct measures to dismantle its 
border with Hong Kong. However, despite the PRC’s actions to integrate Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong continues to make efforts to protect its border, and thus, its identity as a distinct 
autonomous body.  
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